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ABSTRACT: Contextualists with regard to knowledge argue that the truth of the claim 'x knows that P' is 
contextually dependent. In doing so, they attempt to articulate the nature of the contextual dependence. Since part of 
making knowledge claims involves the adequate justification of beliefs, I shall explore whether any epistemic 
contextualist theories can be modified or adapted to provide an account of the context-dependence of justificatory 
strength for arguments. I shall conclude that the prospects are not promising. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Some logicians maintain that the correct evaluation of an argument is context dependent. For 
example, some logicians maintain that whether the premises adequately support the conclusion 
of a given argument is context dependent. Some epistemologists maintain that the correct 
attribution of warrant to belief to achieve knowledge is context dependent. For example, some 
epistemologist maintain that whether your epistemic position is sufficiently strong to make your 
belief justified or warranted or knowledge is context dependent. 
Assume for the moment that both logical contextualism and epistemic contextualism are 
the case. The primary goal of this paper is to begin to explore the relationship between these two 
contextualisms. In particular I shall be very interested in the following question—could the 
mechanisms which underwrite the context dependence of the standards of epistemic justification, 
i.e. the degree to which one’s epistemic position must support one’s belief in order for the belief 
to count as justified, be the same mechanisms which underwrite the context dependence of the 
standards of the justification the conclusion is required to get from the premises in adequate 
arguments? 
In section I, I shall clarify what is meant by ‘context dependence.’ In section II, I shall 
clarify the options for being an epistemic contextualist and for being a logical contextualist and 
suggest some reasons why the two contextualisms might be related. In sections III, IV, and V, I 
shall examine the epistemic contextualist views of David Annis, David Lewis, and Keith DeRose 
respectively. I shall argue that each fails to provide significant insight into the primary question 
and shall conclude that while at a general level the contextualisms have some common 
characteristics, at the specific level of epistemic support and premise support of the conclusion 
there is no evidence that the mechanisms that underwrite these context dependencies are related. 
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1. 
 
What do we mean when we say that a particular attribute is context dependent? One thing we 
might mean, but which turns out to be rather trivial, is just that in some situations an entity has 
the attribute, but in others it does not. But this reading of ‘context dependent’ is just another way 
of saying that the attribute in question is a contingent attribute (at least with regard to that entity) 
and so most properties turn out to be context dependent. For example, on this reading, ‘truth’ 
which many would take as a paradigmatic (though not uncontroversial) example of a context 
independent attribute turns out to be context dependent. After all, in some situations it is true that 
the grass on my front lawn is green, but in others it is not true. 
 A much more restrictive understanding of context dependence is the following: An 
attribute is context dependent just in case the criteria or standards for its correct application vary 
from context to context. In other words it is not just ‘the having of the attribute’ which varies 
from context to context, but rather the ‘what it takes to have the attribute’ which varies from 
context to context. For example, ‘guilt’ is a legally context dependent attribute. In civil court 
only a preponderance of the evidence is what it takes for a legitimate finding of guilt, but in a 
criminal court proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required. 
 We must be careful to distinguish the context dependence of the criteria itself from the 
means of satisfying the criteria. Suppose ‘proficiency’ with regards to basketball shots is ten 
baskets in under 30 seconds from the free throw line. Both person A and B get ten baskets in 
under 30 seconds, but B always requires more shots to get ten baskets than A. For B, what it 
takes to get ten baskets is more shots than what it takes for A, but this does not make 
‘proficiency’ context dependent—the means B must use to satisfy the criteria of proficiency is 
different from A’s, but the criteria both must satisfy is the same. Similarly, there may be various 
means for a prosecutor to establish preponderance of the evidence, but that does not change the 
fact that the threshold which must be passed to establish ‘guilt’ in a civil case is just ‘more likely 
true than not.’ 
 
2. 
 
An epistemological contextualist then is usually one who claims that the ‘knows that’ relation in 
‘x knows that P’ is context dependent, i.e. that the criteria for x to know that P can vary from 
context to context. Let knowledge be warranted belief, where warrant just is whatever it is that 
makes a belief knowledge. Warrant is usually taken to be justification, truth, and ‘something 
else’, where much of epistemology post-Gettier has been devoted to trying to determine what the 
‘something else’ might be. Regardless, if we assume, as I shall, that the criteria for being in a 
belief state are not context dependent, then, if knowledge is context dependent, it must be 
warrant that is context dependent. 
What is it for warrant to be context dependent? One possibility is that warrant itself in 
some contexts is merely, say, justification and truth, but in others is justification, truth, and 
‘something else.’ Another possibility is that in some situations the ‘something else’ is X but in 
others it is Y. Yet another possibility is that while what justification, truth, and the ‘something 
else’ are is constant, the criteria for satisfying at least one of the three are not. In general then, 
either the criteria set for warrant could change in some way from context to context or what it 
takes to satisfy at least one member of the criteria set could vary from context to context. 
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A logical contextualist is often one who claims that the ‘adequate’ attribute applied to 
arguments as in ‘Argument X is adequate’ is context dependent, i.e. that the criteria for X being 
an adequate argument can vary from context to context. Assume that arguments are ordered sets 
of reasons and a conclusion. Assume that arguments are adequate if, at the very least, the 
premises are themselves adequate and the premises sufficiently support the conclusion.  
What then is it for adequacy to be context dependent? One possibility is that adequacy 
itself in some contexts is merely adequate premises which sufficiently support the conclusion, 
but in others it is some additional criterion X along with adequate premises which sufficiently 
support the premises. Another possibility is that the criteria for what counts as sufficient support, 
say, change from context to context. In general then, either the criteria set for adequacy could 
vary in some way or what it takes to satisfy at least one member of the criteria set could vary 
from context to context. 
Given the numerous ways in which warrant and adequacy could be context dependent, it 
is quite possible that the two sorts of contextualism are not similar at all. For example, if warrant 
varies because its criteria set varies, but adequacy varies because the satisfaction conditions of a 
member of its criteria set (which has no analogue in the warrant set) change, then the two 
contextualisms will be unrelated. It may also turn out that the conextualisms are related in some, 
but not all, ways. For example, if warrant varies only because one of its criteria’s satisfaction 
conditions changes, but adequacy varies because both an analogue of the warrant criterion 
changes and adequacy’s criteria set changes then adequacy will turn out to be more context 
dependent than warrant. [Indeed I suspect that many a philosopher’s initial reaction to ‘x knows 
that P’ and ‘Argument X is adequate’ would be that the latter is more context dependent than the 
former. In addition, many epistemologists reject that ‘x knows that P’ is context dependent at all, 
but far more logicians are willing to accept that argument adequacy is context dependent in at 
least some ways.]  
At this point, given the framework above I am going to limit the issue still further. My 
main interest will be the context dependence of sufficient support. In other words I am looking to 
see, first, if there is an analogue of sufficient support in the criteria set for warrant and, second, if 
there is, whether it is context dependent in a way that may be related to the way sufficient 
support is context dependent. 
So is there an analogue of sufficient support in the criteria set of warrant? I maintain that 
the sufficient support relation is context dependent because I maintain that for premises to 
sufficiently support the conclusion the actual support the premises provide must be greater than 
the required support and that required support is context dependent.  
But epistemic justification may also be a sort of support relation—my reasons for 
believing that P are epistemically justificatory just in case they give me enough support for P. 
Hence, what epistemologists say about the context dependence of epistemic justification may 
have a bearing on the context dependence of sufficient support in the realm of argument 
evaluation. [Of course, if it is the ‘something else’ that is making warrant context dependent, 
then, without more knowledge of what the ‘something else’ is, it is hard to see in advance 
whether the examining various theories of the contextual dependence of warrant will have any 
bearing on the contextual dependence of sufficient support.]  
 I turn now to examining some of the mechanisms that have been suggested to account for 
the alleged context dependence of warrant. 
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3. 
 
According to David Annis, in ‘A Contextual Theory of Epistemic Justification’, for ‘S to be 
justified in believing h relative to some specific issue-context, S must be able to meet all current 
objections falling into (A) [that S is not in a position to know that h ] and (B) [that h is false] 
which express a real doubt of the qualified objector group where the objectors are critical truth 
seekers.’ (Annis, p. 295) Put more baldly, for S to be justified in believing h, S must be able to 
meet all relevant objections. What is a relevant objection and what counts as meeting a relevant 
objection will be context dependent, and so epistemic justification is context dependent. 
Annis’ theory is quite general [and given that his goal is to articulate and defend the 
reasonability of a contextualist theory of epistemic justification he cannot be criticized for not 
providing all the details] and clearly has a relation to the general question of whether an 
argument is adequate or not. Consider, for example, the following comment from The Uses of 
Argument: ‘A sound argument, a well-grounded or firmly-backed claim, is one which will stand 
up to criticism, one for which a case can be presented coming up to the standard required if it is 
to deserve a favourable verdict’ (Toulmin, p. 8).  
But even if it is plausible, at a certain level of generality, to say that both adequate 
arguments and epistemically justified beliefs are ones that can be appropriately defended against 
all relevant objections, whether there are any specific similarities remains to be seen. Indeed, by 
focusing on the objector group and the meeting of its objections, Annis obscures the truly 
relevant underlying contextual features.  
According to Annis, ‘the importance (value or utility) attached to outcome of accepting h 
when it is false or rejecting h when it is true is a component of the issue-context’ (Annis, p. 295). 
[I have articulated something similar in earlier work on this topic. (Goddu, 2003)]. However, this 
conflicts with his own notion of how the objector group sets what counts as a relevant objection. 
He writes: ‘[T]o demand a response the objection must be an expression of a real doubt.... S is 
not required to respond to an objection if in general it would be assigned a low probability by the 
people questioning S’ (Annis, p. 294). 
But now consider the following case—a group of doctors is considering the diagnosis put 
forth by a resident given a certain set of symptoms. All agree that the diagnosis is the most likely 
answer given the symptoms. There also exist some less likely possibilities—indeed, one of the 
less likely possibilities is extremely unlikely, but also extremely life threatening if true. The 
doctors can all agree that the probability is extremely low in this context, but that does not stop it 
from being an objection that requires response, for the consequences of failing to rule out the 
extremely unlikely diagnosis can be catastrophic. Hence, what counts as a relevant objection 
cannot be determined solely in terms of what the objector groups considers high or low 
probability cases, but must also be influenced by the costs attached to failing to rule out certain 
possibilities even if the possibilities have very low probabilities.  
Later Annis writes: 
  
[W]e determine whether S is justified in believing h by specifying an issue-context raised within a 
community of people G with certain social practices and norms of justification. This determines the level of 
understanding and knowledge S is expected to have and the standards he is to satisfy. The appropriate 
objector group is a subset of G. To be justified in believing h, S must be able to meet their objections in a 
way that satisfies their practices and norms. (Annis, p. 296) 
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Clearly, Annis’ articulation here better separates the standards or norms of justification from the 
objector group whose objections the justified believer must meet. But other than saying that the 
standards of justification are there and must be met, Annis does not say anything about these 
standards. What we were looking for, however, is some indication of the mechanism by which 
these standards are set such that we could see how they vary from context to context. We must 
look elsewhere. 
 
4. 
 
In ‘Elusive Knowledge’ David Lewis maintains that S knows proposition P iff P holds in every 
possibility left uneliminated by S's evidence; equivalently, iff S's evidence eliminate every 
possibility in which not-P (Lewis, p. 399). But Lewis points out that it cannot be true that we 
really have to eliminate every possibility or else the skeptic wins. Hence, we need to eliminate all 
the possibilities consistent with my evidence (except the ones we can properly ignore). Which 
possibilities we can properly ignore is contextually dependent and so knowledge is contextually 
dependent. 
 Though Lewis does not talk in terms of justification or warrant (and indeed gives some 
comments to suggest that he is not sure these concepts are relevant), what he says can be applied 
to a notion of warrant, i.e. S is warranted in believing h on the basis of E iff h holds in every 
relevant possibility left uneliminated by E. The possible relevance to arguments is clear—a 
premise set P provides sufficient support for a conclusion C iff P leaves no relevant possibility in 
which C is not true, where what counts as a relevant possibility is determined by contextual 
elements—what contextual elements? Lewis provides some answers in the case of knowing that 
h. 
 According to Lewis, when we want to know what possibilities can or cannot be properly 
ignored we appeal to certain rules which determine which features of a particular context are 
relevant and which are not. For example, according to the rule of actuality, whatever possibility 
is the context in which you are in cannot be ignored and according to the rule of belief, whatever 
possibilities one ought to give sufficiently high degrees of belief in the context cannot be 
properly ignored. [What counts as sufficiently high? It depends upon how much is at stake. 
‘When error would be especially disastrous, few possibilities may be properly ignored’ (Lewis, 
p. 402).] Of particular interest to Lewis is the rule of attention, according to which any 
possibility attended to is relevant—it is this rule that explains why knowledge is so elusive (at 
least for epistemologists) for by attending to skeptical possibilities epistemologists can no longer 
properly ignore them. As a result, relevant possibilities obtain in which P is false given the 
evidence and so, in the skeptical context at least, one does not know that P. 
 To what degree, however, are Lewis’ rules for determining which epistemic possibilities 
can be properly ignored relevant to argument evaluation? The rule of attention, for example, is 
not relevant—the mere fact that I bring up the possibility that a demon is deceiving us about our 
probability assessments does not make the possibility an acceptable objection to the calculation 
of how much support premises actually give a conclusion.  
While I suspect that many of Lewis’ rules can be individually shown to have little 
bearing on argument evaluation, a more general problem exists. Consider the following 
argument: 
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George has one ticket. 
There were 100,000,000 distinct tickets sold. 
At most one ticket won. 
George did not win.  
 
The possibility that George’s ticket is a winning ticket, while quite improbable, cannot be 
properly ignored so, according to Lewis, we do not know that George did not win. We do not 
know that George did not win even though our evidence provides an enormous amount of 
support to the belief that George did not win. But at the same time, this enormous amount of 
support will be sufficient in many contexts to accept the conclusion on the basis of the 
premises—in other words, the argument will be an adequate argument even though we cannot 
say that we know the conclusion to be true. But this shows that sufficient support for arguments 
is not a matter of showing that the conclusion is true in all relevant possibilities. We can 
recognize that George having the winning ticket is a relevant possibility, but still accept the 
argument because the possibility is so improbable.  
Put another way, the problem is that infalibilists about knowledge such as Lewis, are 
looking for mechanisms that allow us to treat as non-relevant all cases in which our belief is 
false. But unless you are a deductivist, there is no corresponding motivation to seek such 
mechanisms when judging the adequacy of arguments. After all, in many contexts we do not 
need all relevant possibilities in which the conclusion is false to be eliminated for an argument to 
be adequate. We can recognize falsifying relevant possibilities, but still hold that the premises 
sufficiently support the conclusion. For example, consider a civil trial. The jury may easily 
recognize plenty of scenarios consistent with the evidence in which the accused is not guilty. But 
if a preponderance of the evidence supports the accused’s guilt, then the evidence sufficiently 
supports the finding of guilt. 
But if Lewis’ epistemic support is a matter of ruling out all non-relevant epistemic 
possibilities and sufficient logical support is not a ruling out of all non-relevant logical 
possibilities, then the mechanisms underlying Lewis’ epistemic support are likely not the 
mechanisms underlying the context sensitivity of sufficient support in arguments. The possibility 
remains that some of Lewis’ rules may have a bearing on sufficient support. [For example, 
Lewis’ system may be relevant for someone who wants to argue that the validity relation is 
context sensitive. An argument is valid iff it is not possible for all the premises to be true and the 
conclusion false, i.e. the premises exclude the possibility of the conclusion being false. If what is 
a possibility that needs to be excluded is context sensitive in the way Lewis describes, then 
validity may be context sensitive.] But given that the general thrust of Lewis’ rules is towards 
elimination of all falsifying possibilities, whereas this is not a general thrust of non-deductivist 
theories of sufficient support we have some evidence that Lewis’ rules have at best limited 
application to a theory of sufficient support.  
 
5.  
 
According to Keith DeRose a warranted belief is one that is both justified and sensitive. Being 
justified is just a matter of having one’s beliefs concerning P track the facts not only in the world 
as it is, but also in possibilities similar to the way the world is. The problem is that justification is 
not enough—I am in equally good epistemic positions with respect to: I have hands and I am not 
a brain in a vat and yet we are more inclined to say that I know the former, but not the latter. The 
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difference is that the former belief is sensitive while the latter is not. In other words, in the 
nearest similar possibility in which I do not have hands, I don’t believe that I have hands, but in 
the nearest similar possibility in which I am a brain in a vat, I still believe I am not. In other 
words, my former belief is sensitive to it actually not being the case, but my latter belief is not. 
The net effect of DeRose’s view, which he sketches via what he calls the Rule of 
Sensitivity (DeRose, p. 492), is that how far away from the way things actually are my beliefs 
must track the facts in order for me to count as justified is set by how far away the closest 
possibility is in which what I believe is false. The closest possibility in which I do not have 
hands is relatively close, at least when compared to the possibility that Pluto is made of green 
cheese. Hence, it is easier to be in a good epistemic position with regards to my having no hands 
than with respect to Pluto being made of green cheese. Put quite generally, the requirement that a 
warranted belief be sensitive sets the bar for how justified one needs to be. 
So the question is whether there is an analogue of ‘sensitivity’ with respect to sufficient 
support? The short answer seems to be ‘no.’ Firstly, sensitivity of belief is just a special case of 
my beliefs tracking the facts and there is no analogue of tracking the facts when we determine 
sufficient support. Tracking of the facts requires a similarity ordering of epistemic possibilities, 
but there is no reason to think that determining sufficient support, i.e. whether the actual support 
is at least as great as the required support, mandates a similarity ordering of logical possibilities. 
Secondly, beliefs may be more or less sensitive, but in what sense are conclusions or arguments 
more or less ‘sensitive’? Indeed, unless you are a deductivist, the fact that there are possibilities 
in which the premises are true and the conclusion false is not always a problem for an argument. 
Even if you are deductivist and are considering a valid argument, you need not interpret the 
discovery of a false conclusion as a problem for the degree of support the premises give that 
conclusion. Instead you can merely hold that while the degree of support is unchanged, given 
that the conclusion is false, the argument has another serious flaw—viz. at least one of the 
premises is false.  
But if there is no logical analogue of the epistemic concept of sensitivity, then epistemic 
contextualisms that utilize sensitivity as the mechanism for the context dependence of epistemic 
justification will have no bearing on logical contextualism. Hence, DeRose’s epistemic 
contextualism will not provide insight into the mechanism underwriting the context dependence 
of sufficient support.  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
There are other epistemic contextualist theories yet to be considered. [See for example, Cohen, 
1988]. Based on the theories considered, however, there has been little success in using 
epistemic contextualism as a guide for the mechanism that underlies the context sensitivity of 
sufficient support. Annis’ theory pointed to a possible general similarity but provided no specific 
mechanisms. Lewis’ theory seemed at best applicable to a deductivist model of logical support, 
yet deductivists are least inclined to accept the context sensitivity of sufficient support. Finally, 
DeRose’s theory posited a mechanism that just had no analogue in the realm of argument 
evaluation. So while there may be general similarities between the posited context dependence of 
epistemic justification and the posited context dependence of sufficient support, no evidence has 
yet been found that the mechanisms that underwrite these context dependencies are related. 
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